The prohibition of Resale Price Maintenance

Published on 22 June 2023 · Last updated 25 October 2026

Resale price maintenance (RPM; in Dutch: verticale prijsbinding) means that a supplier restricts a buyer’s freedom to set its own resale price, for example by imposing a fixed or minimum price. Under Dutch law, RPM is in principle prohibited by the cartel prohibition of Article 6(1) Dutch Competition Act (Mededingingswet). A prohibited agreement is void, and the competition authority ACM can impose fines.

Competition authorities have long scrutinised RPM because it removes price competition between retailers that sell the same brand. In the Netherlands, the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) has warned suppliers about RPM several times since 2022, and in 2021 it fined Samsung for RPM. This article explains the Dutch rule and its exceptions, the ACM’s enforcement and tools, and what this means for suppliers and retailers on the Dutch market. Our team also advises on Dutch Distribution Law.

What is resale price maintenance under Dutch law?

The Dutch Competition Act has no separate RPM provision, and there is no Dutch “resale price maintenance act”. RPM is assessed under the general cartel prohibition. (Books are the exception: under the Fixed Book Price Act (Wet op de vaste boekenprijs), publishers must set a fixed price for books and sheet music they first publish in the Netherlands, and sellers must in principle apply it to end customers, Articles 2 and 6.) Article 6(1) Competition Act prohibits agreements between undertakings and concerted practices that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition on the Dutch market or a part of it. Agreements prohibited under Article 6(1) are void by operation of law (Article 6(2)).

An RPM arrangement does not have to be written down; oral arrangements and concerted practices also count (ACM Guidelines on arrangements between suppliers and buyers (2019), marginals 5-6). In the Samsung case, the District Court of Rotterdam held that the supplier had regularly set the online resale prices of at least seven retailers, which was an agreement and/or concerted practice with the object of restricting competition. Contractual coercion, sanctions or direct financial incentives are not required for that finding (District Court of Rotterdam 13 November 2023, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2023:10490). The ACM regards RPM as a hardcore restriction; a suggested resale price or a maximum resale price is not (Guidelines, marginal 9).

How does the ACM act against resale price maintenance?

On 20 March 2023, the ACM announced that it had warned several suppliers of smart sports devices, food supplements and portable television receivers that they may have exerted undue influence over the resale prices of retailers. This followed its campaign “Who sets the price?” (Wie bepaalt de prijs?) of 17 October 2022.

The ACM said it keeps a close watch on several companies to see whether they comply. On 3 April 2024 it announced a further round of warnings to suppliers of construction materials, bicycle and car accessories, batteries and care products. The ACM also stated that it has limited resources: on the basis of its prioritisation policy it decides which reports to investigate further, and in other cases it can send a warning letter.

Warnings are not the only instrument. On 14 September 2021, the ACM fined Samsung Electronics Benelux over €39 million for influencing the online retail prices of television sets of seven retailers between 2013 and 2018. The District Court of Rotterdam dismissed Samsung’s appeal in 2023. On further appeal, the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal (College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven, CBb) agreed that there was an agreement and/or concerted practice on online resale prices. It referred questions to the EU Court of Justice on how the economic and legal context must be examined and stayed the case (CBb 3 February 2026, ECLI:NL:CBB:2026:34, paras. 6.4-6.5 and decision). That fine is therefore not yet final.

Why must a retailer set its own prices?

At the heart of the prohibition of RPM lies the principle that retailers should be able to set their selling prices independently, free from any undue influence by suppliers.

Suppliers may give non-binding recommended retail prices. According to the ACM, a supplier that also pressures retailers to charge those prices commits a serious violation. Pressure can take the form of not delivering products, or of phone calls and text messages that strongly urge retailers to stick to the recommended price. A supplier can never ask retailers to raise their prices, so it cannot prohibit discounts either (ACM, 17 October 2022). Retailers that complain to a supplier about the prices of other retailers also go too far, and suppliers must ignore such complaints (ACM, 29 September 2021). The prohibition is not absolute; the exceptions are discussed below.

Which tool does the ACM offer entrepreneurs?

To support compliance, the ACM has published a recommended retail price check (adviesprijscheck, in Dutch). Suppliers can use this checklist to see whether they comply with the rules.

In addition, retailers can use the tool to assess whether their suppliers are exerting any unlawful influence on their sales prices, both in-store and online.

To further support retailers who believe they may be experiencing RPM at the hands of their suppliers, the ACM has also provided a sample letter (voorbeeldbrief, in Dutch). Retailers can use it to tell their supplier what the rules on resale prices and recommended prices are, and to object to the supplier’s conduct.

Are there exceptions to the RPM prohibition?

Yes, but they are narrow. First, the de minimis exemption (bagatelvrijstelling) in Article 7(1) Competition Act disapplies Article 6(1) if no more than eight undertakings are involved and their combined turnover in the previous calendar year does not exceed €5,500,000 where they mainly supply goods, or €1,100,000 in all other cases. The ACM’s guidelines confirm that this exemption can also cover RPM (marginal 13 and example 5). Separate agreements with the same purpose between one undertaking and two or more others are treated as one agreement (Article 7(3)), so a supplier’s dealer agreements are counted together.

Second, Article 6(1) does not apply to agreements that contribute to improving production or distribution or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing users a fair share of the resulting benefit, provided they do not impose restrictions that are not indispensable to those objectives and do not make it possible to eliminate competition for a substantial part of the products or services concerned (Article 6(3)). The company that relies on this exception must prove that the conditions are met (Article 6(4)). According to the ACM, RPM seldom meets these conditions, but a supplier can still invoke the exception (Guidelines, marginal 26).

Recommended and maximum resale prices are not RPM in themselves. A suggested or maximum resale price is not a hardcore restriction (Guidelines, marginal 9), but a recommended price must remain genuinely non-binding.

What are the consequences of non-compliance?

A business that engages in prohibited RPM faces three types of consequences under Dutch law. The RPM clause is void (Article 6(2) Competition Act). The ACM can establish the infringement, impose an administrative fine or impose an order subject to a penalty (Article 56 Competition Act). And parties that suffer loss can claim damages; the Dutch Civil Code contains specific rules for damages caused by infringements of competition law, including Article 6 Competition Act (Articles 6:193k and following Dutch Civil Code).

The maximum fine is €900,000 or, if higher, 10% of the undertaking’s turnover (Article 57(1) Competition Act). For an infringement of Article 6(1), that maximum is multiplied by the number of years the infringement lasted, with a minimum of one and a maximum of four years (Article 57(3)). It is doubled if a fine for an earlier similar infringement became final in the five years before the date of the ACM’s report (Article 57(5)). Suppliers and retailers should therefore review their pricing practices and communication, for example with the ACM’s checklist.

How does the RPM prohibition affect supply relationships?

While the ACM’s enforcement of the RPM prohibition is aimed at encouraging a competitive market environment, it is essential for businesses to understand the wider implications of these rules.

The prohibition of RPM can impact supply chain dynamics and relationships between suppliers and retailers, necessitating adjustments in pricing strategies and communication methods. Furthermore, businesses operating in the Dutch market must be prepared to adapt to the ACM’s ongoing monitoring efforts and adjust their practices accordingly.

Conclusion

The prohibition of resale price maintenance is an essential aspect of competition regulation, as it seeks to protect the autonomy of retailers and ensure fair competition within the market.

The ACM’s actions, including the development of a recommended price check tool and issuing repeated warnings against RPM practices, demonstrate the regulator’s commitment to enforcing these rules. As a result, suppliers and retailers operating in the Netherlands must stay alert in their compliance efforts and be prepared to adapt to a more closely monitored market.

Frequently asked questions about resale price maintenance

What is resale price maintenance?

Resale price maintenance (RPM) means that a supplier restricts its buyers’ freedom to set their own resale price, for example by imposing a fixed or minimum price or by pressuring retailers to follow a “recommended” price. In Dutch it is called verticale prijsbinding. The ACM regards RPM as a hardcore restriction of competition.

Is resale price maintenance legal in the Netherlands?

In principle, no. RPM falls under the cartel prohibition of Article 6(1) Dutch Competition Act, and a prohibited agreement is void (Article 6(2)). It is only allowed if an exception applies, such as the de minimis exemption of Article 7(1) or the efficiency exception of Article 6(3); a company relying on Article 6(3) must prove that its conditions are met (Article 6(4)).

Is there a Dutch resale price maintenance act?

No. The Netherlands has no general statute on resale or retail price maintenance; the Fixed Book Price Act, which requires fixed prices for books and sheet music, is a sector-specific exception. RPM is otherwise assessed under the general cartel prohibition in Article 6 Competition Act, which the ACM enforces with the powers of Article 56.

Are recommended or maximum resale prices allowed?

According to the ACM’s guidelines, a suggested resale price or a maximum resale price is not a hardcore restriction. A recommended price must remain non-binding: if a supplier pressures retailers to charge it, for example by threatening to stop deliveries, the ACM regards this as a serious violation.

What is the fine for resale price maintenance in the Netherlands?

The ACM can impose a fine of up to €900,000 or, if higher, 10% of turnover (Article 57(1) Competition Act). For an infringement of Article 6(1), that maximum is multiplied by the duration in years, with a minimum of one and a maximum of four (Article 57(3)). In 2021 the ACM fined Samsung over €39 million for influencing online television prices; in February 2026 the CBb stayed Samsung’s appeal pending a ruling of the EU Court of Justice.